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Introduction 
Statutory procedures 
Statutory party wall procedures are now an almost inevitable feature of city centre 
construction projects. They involve the service of notices and the appointment of 
surveyors who publish awards to resolve a variety of construction-related issues 
affecting structures in boundary locations. They are part of a statutory code which has 
operated under the London Building Acts since 1855 and which was extended to the 
whole of England and Wales by the Party Wall etc Act 1996.1
 
The statutory procedures apply to construction operations in three different situations. 
They are most frequently encountered where works (‘party wall works’) are carried 
out to a party wall or other shared boundary structure.2 They also apply to the erection 
of a new boundary structure3 (‘line of junction works’) and to excavations which have 
the potential to interfere with the stability of an adjacent building or structure4
 
 
(‘adjacent excavations’). 
There are minor differences between the procedures in each of these three situations. 
However, they all commence with the service, by a property owner wishing to 
undertake the work (the ‘building owner’), of an originating notice on an adjoining 
owner whose property will be affected by it.5 The adjoining owner can respond in a 
number of different ways but in most cases a dispute will arise between the parties 
within the meaning of the legislation. Although there is then scope for this to be 
resolved by a single agreed surveyor the parties will usually each appoint a surveyor 
and the two surveyors will publish a joint award which will regulate the conduct of 
the works.6
 
 
Agreements between the parties 
Despite the existence of this procedural framework it is common for the parties, or 
their surveyors, to depart from it by agreement. This may sometimes involve reaching 
an agreement to undertake the works entirely outside the statutory framework. More 
frequently, it will involve an agreement, or series of agreements, about the future 
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conduct of the statutory procedures which may be at variance with the strict wording 
of the legislation. The motivation for the agreement may lie in a wish to avoid the 
delays and costs associated with the statutory framework. Alternatively, it may arise 
from a reluctance to institute a formal dispute resolution procedure in situations 
where, in reality, a situation of amity exists between the parties. 
 
Agreements typically arise in four different contexts. Firstly, as stated above, the 
parties may seek to exclude the Act entirely by concluding an agreement which pre-
empts the service of an originating notice. Secondly, in circumstances where an 
originating notice has already been served, they may seek to avoid the need for 
surveyors to produce an award by themselves reaching agreement about the nature 
and conduct of the works. Thirdly, where works have commenced in breach of the 
Act, the parties sometimes seek to regularise the situation by agreeing on the 
retrospective operation of the statutory machinery. Finally, and most frequently, the 
parties or their surveyors may agree that variations can be made to the nature of the 
proposed work. 
 
Although these practices have become commonplace it is unclear whether the Act 
anticipates that the parties and their surveyors should be free to contract in and out of 
its provisions at will. This article therefore explores the extent to which they are free 
to do so. It examines each of the four practices in turn and considers the validity of the 
agreements reached in each case. 
 
Agreements in lieu of notice 
Informal agreements 
Let us first consider the situation where the parties conclude an agreement about the 
conduct of the works in the absence of an originating notice having first been served. 
These agreements, sometimes described as ‘informal agreements’, purport to contract 
out of the Act entirely by recording the basis on which the parties agree to the work 
proceeding.7
 
 
They will often be prepared by a surveyor and will typically be based around a signed 
statement by the adjoining owner consenting to the proposed work. The work will 
usually be described by reference to drawings which will be appended to the 
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document. Other terms might also be included with a view to regulating the ongoing 
conduct of the works including a requirement that damage to the adjoining owner’s 
property be made good. 
 
Informal agreements are most likely to be encountered in what have become known as 
“small works” situations involving small scale house alterations by owner occupiers.8
 
 
The costs of administering the statutory procedures (typically borne entirely by the 
building owner) may be disproportionate to the value of such a project and there will 
be considerable savings for a building owner who can persuade his neighbour to reach 
agreement in these circumstances. They might also be entered into, possibly on 
payment of monetary consideration to the adjoining owner, where a building owner is 
anxious to circumvent the statutory notice periods in order to make an early start on 
site. However, the question posed by this article is whether these agreements can 
effectively free the parties from compliance with the statutory procedures. 
Section 3(3)(a) 
The question is only partially answered by the express provisions within the Act. 
Section 3(3)(a) waives the requirement for service of an originating notice where the 
adjoining owner consents to party wall works in writing. Unfortunately, the Act is 
entirely silent on whether the parties have a similar right to contract out of the 
statutory procedures in the context of line of junction works and adjacent excavations. 
 
It might be thought that attempts to evade the statutory provisions are, in their nature, 
unlawful and that section 3(3)(a) provides a special dispensation for such 
arrangements in the limited context of party wall works. The decision in Stevens v 
Gourley9
 
 might be seen as providing some support for this view. The court in that 
case held that a contract made in contravention of the Metropolitan Building Act 
1855, in which the party wall code first appeared, was void on grounds of illegality.  
Inherent right to contract out 
The alternative possibility is that section 3(3)(a) is merely declaratory of the parties’ 
inherent right to contract out of the legislation in respect of all types of work. Its 
failure, for whatever reason10, to make any reference to line of junction works and 
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adjacent excavations would therefore have no impact on the parties’ ability to contract 
out of these works in addition to those dealing with party walls. 
 
It is submitted that this is the better view and that, in the context of the present 
discussion, Stevens v Gourley should be distinguished. The contract in that case was 
for the erection of a building in contravention of the building control provisions in 
Part I of the 1855 Act. Such provisions are matters of public law, enforceable by 
criminal sanction. They deal with matters of public safety and it is entirely right that 
the courts should prohibit their exclusion by private agreement. In contrast, the party 
wall code, which first appeared in Part III of that Act, is a creature of private law. 
Although having its origins in the same statute as London’s building control regime it 
is concerned solely with the adjustment of private rights between individuals and 
other legal persons.11
 
 When viewed in this context there seems little justification for 
interfering with the parties’ freedom to contract in relation to matters which are 
entirely personal to them. 
This view is further supported by the particular way in which the code operates. It 
grants rights to building owners to undertake certain categories of work to adjoining 
owners’ properties that would otherwise constitute a trespass.12 Rights are granted in 
the context of line of junction and adjacent excavation works in addition to those 
affecting party walls so there seems no reason why the legislators should have 
intended to treat these works any differently.13 Where these rights are exercised the 
statutory procedures provide protection for adjoining owners whose property is being 
interfered with.14 Compliance with these procedures, beginning with the service of an 
originating notice, is therefore an essential precondition for the exercise of the 
statutory rights.15
 
 However, if the building owner chooses not to exercise his statutory 
rights, for example because he has secured equivalent rights by agreement with his 
adjoining owner, the statutory procedures must be redundant. For all these reasons it 
is considered that the parties are at liberty to contract out of all the statutory 
arrangements by informal agreement, should they choose to do so. 
Subsequent disputes 
Entering into an informal agreement is, of course, no guarantee that the parties can 
avoid subsequent disputes about the conduct of the works. Where such disputes arise 
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it is often assumed that they can still be referred to appointed surveyors for resolution 
under the Act.16
 
 Such assumptions are based on an assumption that the Act, rather 
than the common law, continues to define the underlying rights between the parties. 
They are reinforced by a literal reading of section 10(1) which provides that surveyors 
must be appointed to resolve disputes “in respect of any matter connected with any 
work to which this Act relates”. 
It is unlikely that either notion is correct. Despite the apparent breadth of section 10(1) 
the courts have consistently ruled that rights under the Act, and the surveyors’ 
statutory jurisdiction, are each dependent on the prior service of an originating 
notice.17 In the absence of such notice neither these rights, nor the surveyors’ statutory 
function can have any relevance. Once the parties have concluded an informal 
agreement to contract out of the Act, the statutory code, by definition, ceases to have 
effect. From that point, the parties’ rights are regulated by the terms of their 
agreement rather than by the statute.18
 
 Subsequent disputes about the interpretation of 
the agreement are therefore a matter for the courts, rather than for surveyors, to 
resolve. 
Finally, it should be noted that informal agreements to contract out of the Act 
sometimes contain express provisions referring subsequent disputes to surveyors for 
resolution under the Act.19 For the reasons already described, the statute has no role in 
the absence of an originating notice and these provisions must, of necessity, be 
ineffective. Unless they can be construed in some other way20 they will also be void 
for uncertainty and may even jeopardise the whole agreement on this basis. Having 
taken a decision to contract out of the Act, such attempts to contract back in again are 
therefore unwise. If the parties see the ongoing involvement of surveyors as desirable 
then their agreement would be better served by the inclusion of an arbitration or 
expert determination clause. As an alternative, in view of the undoubted benefits 
provided by the Act, they might wish to reconsider their decision to contract out of its 
procedures in the first place. 
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Agreements subsequent to notice 
Consent notices 
We can now consider the various forms of agreement which are commonly entered 
into once an originating notice has actually been served. The most straightforward 
form occurs where an adjoining owner simply serves “a notice indicating his consent” 
(or ‘consent notice’) to the works described in the originating notice within fourteen 
days of receiving the same, as anticipated by sections 5 and 6(7) of the 1996 Act. He 
will typically do so, either by completing and returning a standard acknowledgement 
of service form to this effect21
 
 or by confirming his consent by letter. 
The service of such a notice indicates the absence of a dispute between the parties and 
enables the Act’s dispute resolution procedures to be dispensed with22
 
. The building 
owner is therefore immediately able to proceed with his work on the basis of the 
adjoining owner’s agreement rather than having to wait for the publication of an 
award by surveyors. 
Effect of consent notices 
In these situations it is not entirely clear whether the building owner’s authority to 
undertake the work arises from a contract with the adjoining owner or whether, 
despite the adjoining owner’s consent, it continues to rest on the exercise of his 
statutory rights23
 
. The issue is important as it will determine how subsequent disputes 
between the parties should be resolved. 
If authority rests on a contract between the parties the situation will be synonymous 
with that, already described, under an informal agreement. The contract will displace 
the statutory code which will then have no further relevance. Subsequent disputes 
about the conduct of the works will be matters for the courts. The other possibility is 
that service of an originating notice triggers a statutory procedure which cannot then 
be displaced. By serving the notice the building owner asserts his intention to exercise 
the statutory rights and the procedure is then bound to take its course to ensure that he 
is able to do so. 
 
According to this second interpretation, an adjoining owner who consents to the work 
should not be regarded as indicating a wish to depart from the statutory procedures 
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and indeed he would not be free to do so. He is simply consenting, in accordance with 
the Act’s express provisions, to the exercise of the building owner’s statutory rights. 
Although the adjoining owner’s consent obviates the need for the immediate 
implementation of the Act’s dispute resolution machinery it would not exclude it 
permanently. Instead, it would continue to be available to the parties and could be 
called upon by them at any time should a dispute subsequently arise. 
 
On balance, the Act appears to favour the second interpretation. Specifically, in 
section 7(5), it describes works which proceed on the basis of an agreement as still 
being “executed in pursuance of the Act”. This suggests the exercise of statutory, 
rather than contractual, rights as well as the continuing relevance of the statutory 
code24. Further support for this position is provided by Leadbetter v Marylebone 
Corporation25
 
 where the statutory time limit for commencement of notified works 
was held to apply, notwithstanding the service of a consent notice by the adjoining 
owner. 
If the statutory code continues to be relevant then so too must its dispute resolution 
machinery, should the parties decide to call upon it. Its operation is not confined to 
disputes which arise immediately following the service of an originating notice but is 
also available to settle ongoing disputes during the course of the works26. Although, in 
the absence of an initial dispute, surveyors will generally not yet have been appointed, 
there appears to be no impediment to their subsequent appointment if the need 
arises27
 
.  
Conditional consents 
In practice, despite the ongoing availability of the Act’s dispute resolution machinery, 
it will often be unwise for an adjoining owner to provide his unconditional consent to 
the works by way of a consent notice. In reality, he will only be properly protected 
where the works have been described in considerably more detail than will typically 
have been included in an originating notice. The condition of his own property should 
also have been recorded in advance, in order to provide a basis for calculating 
compensation in the event of damage occurring. 
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As the statutory dispute resolution machinery provides protection in both these areas 
most surveyors advise adjoining owners against consenting to the works. Others argue 
that, particularly in small works situations, the use of formal dispute resolution 
procedures is divisive and unnecessarily costly in terms of professional fees.28  They 
suggest that it is often more appropriate to protect adjoining owners by what are 
usually referred to as “conditional consent” agreements.29
 
 
As their name implies, these agreements record the adjoining owner’s consent to the 
originating notice, subject to particular conditions regarding the conduct of the work. 
They are invariably prepared by surveyors and will typically incorporate detailed 
drawings and a schedule of condition as well as addressing many of the issues usually 
included in a statutory award. They are often expressed as being “issued under” the 
Act and usually contain an express provision referring subsequent disputes to 
surveyors to be settled by award in accordance with its normal provisions. 
 
Status and validity of conditional consents 
In common with other forms of hybrid agreement considered in this article, it is 
difficult to determine the legal status, or the validity, of conditional consents with any 
certainty. Nevertheless, for the reasons already discussed in the context of consent 
notices30
 
, it seems that they cannot be contractual arrangements and must therefore 
depend on the Act for their validity. 
The Act contains no express provisions dealing with conditional consents and 
confines its consent arrangements to those already described in the context of consent 
notices. It therefore seems that conditional consents can only be effective to the extent 
that they are consistent with these arrangements. In practice this will depend on the 
nature of the conditions imposed and on the extent to which a particular agreement 
can still be regarded as “a notice indicating…consent” to works described in an 
originating notice31
 
. 
In this context, the inclusion of detailed drawings and a schedule of condition which 
were not part of the originating notice are probably not, in themselves, inconsistent 
with the Act’s provisions. They represent good practice by the parties and clarify 
matters of detail rather than challenging the nature of the works described in the 
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notice. Indeed, section 7(5)(b) contemplates that the parties may agree on “plans, 
sections and particulars” without any requirement that these should have been served 
with the originating notice. Other conditions may also be included along the lines of 
those commonly contained in a statutory award. The adjoining owner’s consent to the 
originating notice is presumably unaffected by these to the extent that they simply 
echo the statutory obligations which already exist between them. 
 
However, conditions which purport to impose additional obligations, some of which 
may even be at variance with the statute, will be ineffective. The primacy of the 
statutory rules over contractual arrangements has already been described32 and is also 
illustrated by the decision in Mason v Fulham Corporation33. In that case the plaintiff 
sued to recover a contribution towards the cost of party wall works under the relevant 
provision in a conditional consent. As an originating notice had previously been 
served the works were undertaken under statutory, rather than contractual, authority. 
The court therefore confined itself to an analysis of the equivalent provision in the 
legislation34
 
 and rejected the claim on this basis. The provision in the conditional 
consent was thus entirely irrelevant. 
More seriously, such conditions may also jeopardise the adjoining owner’s consent 
itself. The Act makes provision for him to consent to works which are described in an 
originating notice and which the building owner proposes to undertake in accordance 
with its particular statutory framework. If the adjoining owner consents to the works, 
but on some other basis, or subject to additional conditions, a court may well follow 
established contract principles and conclude that he has not consented at all35
 
. 
Delayed consents 
It will be recalled that sections 5 and 6(7) anticipate a consent being forthcoming 
within fourteen days of an originating notice being served36. It is sometimes suggested 
that this cannot prevent the parties from concluding an agreement at a later date as it 
cannot defeat their inherent right to contract out of the Act.37
 
 Indeed, conditional 
consents, which in practice often fall foul of the fourteen day time limit, frequently 
cite section 3(3) as providing the necessary authority to do so. 
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It is submitted that this is not how the Act is intended to operate. As we have seen, 
section 3(3) deals with the situation before the statute has been triggered by service of 
an originating notice and preserves the parties’ inherent rights to conclude their own 
agreement.38
 
 However, once triggered by notice the statute imposes its own regime on 
the parties, including the requirements dealing with post-notice consents in sections 5 
and 6(7). These leave no room for an agreement between the parties outside the 
fourteen day time limit. Both sections provide that an adjoining owner who fails to 
serve a consent notice within fourteen days “shall be deemed to have dissented from 
the [originating] notice and a dispute shall be deemed to have arisen between the 
parties”. 
The Act’s dispute resolution machinery then immediately comes into operation. 
Under section 10(1) the parties are required to appoint surveyors who, by section 
10(10), are then obliged to settle the dispute by award. There is no suggestion that 
these statutory arrangements can be halted by the parties at any time and, in fact, 
every indication to the contrary. In particular, once surveyors have been appointed, 
the parties have no right to dismiss them.39 The surveyors perform a statutory function 
and, even if they receive contrary instructions from the parties, must bring matters to a 
satisfactory conclusion through the publication of an award40
 
. 
Although perhaps initially surprising, this element of compulsion is entirely consistent 
with the aims of the legislation. The statutory regime is not primarily a dispute 
resolution mechanism but a means of facilitating construction operations involving 
boundary structures41. As we have seen, it achieves this by granting building owners 
an absolute right to undertake such works, subject only to the provision of adequate 
safeguards for adjoining owners. The primary mechanism for providing these 
safeguards is through a surveyors’ award rather than by agreement. By taking matters 
out of the parties’ hands, and entrusting them to independent professionals, the Act 
provides building owners with a degree of certainty and reduces the risk of works 
being frustrated by protracted negotiations. Although it preserves a limited facility for 
the parties to proceed by agreement, the primary concern is to achieve a solution 
rather than an agreement. If the parties have failed to achieve this by the expiry of the 
fourteen day time limit the Act will impose one upon them. By doing so, even in the 
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face of a later agreement by the parties, it denies the opportunity to an obstructive 
adjoining owner to further protract negotiations. 
 
It is therefore considered that the service of a consent notice, or the making of a 
conditional consent, can have no effect where they take place more than fourteen days 
after the service of the originating notice. Parties who enter into such arrangements 
will deprive themselves of legal protection during the subsequent works and surveyors 
who collude in them will be exposed to liability in negligence.42
 
 Nevertheless, the 
statutory procedures need not be in conflict with the wishes of the parties. Although 
the surveyors have exclusive authority to determine the basis on which the works 
should proceed they will rarely do so in isolation from their appointing owners. 
Where the owners are in agreement about the conduct of the works it will normally be 
appropriate for the surveyors to reflect this within the terms of their award. 
Agreements to regularise unlawful works 
Written agreements 
A third category of agreement is sometimes encountered which is entered into once 
work has actually started. Despite the requirements of the Act it is not uncommon for 
building owners to commence works without any prior communication with their 
adjoining owners. In the absence of consent or originating notice these works are, of 
course, unlawful and would entitle an adjoining owner to redress in the law of 
trespass.43
 
 As an alternative to litigation the parties may attempt to regularise the 
situation by agreement. 
This will often involve entering into a written agreement which records the basis on 
which the adjoining owner’s claim is settled and the terms on which any future works 
are to proceed. There seems no reason to question the validity of such arrangements. 
They deal with the private rights of the parties and, for the reasons already explored in 
the context of informal agreements44, the parties retain their freedom of contract in 
relation to such matters, despite the provisions of the Act. 
 11 
Retrospective notices 
Unfortunately, once again, the situation is often complicated by the use of an 
alternative hybrid form of agreement in place of that described above. This takes the 
form of an agreement between the parties to belatedly proceed under the statutory 
code. It involves the service of an originating notice, which the parties agree shall 
have retrospective effect, followed by the appointment of surveyors and the 
publication of an award in the normal way. 
 
The difficulty arises over the concept of a retrospective notice by consent. Firstly, it 
seems unlikely that the Act can be intended to operate in such a way that an unlawful 
act can retrospectively be transformed into a lawful one. Secondly, the limited 
possibilities for tailoring the statutory machinery by agreement have already been 
noted in the context of conditional consents and delayed consents.45
 
 It is difficult to 
reconcile this with the notion that the parties should be free to contract into their own 
version of the machinery at will, rather than through strict adherence to its statutory 
provisions. 
The words of the statute certainly seem to support the first proposition as they 
expressly require the service of originating notices to take place before 
commencement of the works to which they relate46. Similarly, in Woodhouse v 
Consolidated Property Corporation Ltd47 an award was held to be invalid where it 
purported to address works which predated the appointment of surveyors. The 
possible curative effects of a notice on earlier unlawful works were also considered in 
Louis v Sadiq.48
 
  Although the Court of Appeal recognised that the building owner 
was entitled to legitimise future work by service of a belated notice it held that he 
remained liable for continuing losses arising out of the earlier works. In other words, 
the service of the originating notice could not retrospectively sanction that which was 
already unlawful. 
Despite the apparent clarity of these authorities the parties may nevertheless be able to 
vary this position by agreement. In Adams v Marylebone Borough Council49 works 
undertaken without service of an originating notice were restrained by injunction and 
damages awarded for the losses suffered by the adjoining owner. The situation was 
subsequently regularised by service of an originating notice which the parties agreed 
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was to have retrospective effect. The Court of Appeal later rejected a claim by the 
plaintiff for further losses incurred as a result of the original works as these had now 
been rendered lawful by the notice which Vaughan Williams LJ described as having 
been validly served nunc pro tunc.50
 
 
It therefore seems that, contrary to all expectations, an agreement between the parties 
will be sufficient to give retrospective effect to the statute. Indeed, in Louis v Sadiq, 
Evans LJ declared that, although the Adams decision might appear to be “not in 
accordance with principle” it would nevertheless, in the absence of distinguishing 
factors, have been binding on the Court of Appeal. 
 
Agreements relating to variations 
Authority to undertake variations 
A building owner may sometimes decide to vary the nature of his proposals after all 
the party wall issues have been satisfactorily concluded by agreement or award. This 
presents him, and his professional advisors, with the challenge of obtaining authority 
to undertake the revised works within a very short time scale. Surveyors often express 
uncertainty as to whether a further award (an addendum award), or even service of a 
further notice, is required in such circumstances or whether it is possible to expedite 
matters by agreement. The final section of this article explores these issues and 
considers the extent to which variations can legitimately be dealt with by agreement 
between the parties or their surveyors. 
 
Works in pursuance of the Act 
If arrangements for undertaking the original works were concluded after service of an 
originating notice then, as already discussed, such works are said to be “in pursuance 
of the Act”51. As we have seen, this will be the case whether these works were 
ultimately authorised by agreement or by award52. According to the statute the 
appropriate mechanism for dealing with a variation in these circumstances then seems 
to depend on whether it amounts to a change in the design of the original work or a 
proposal to undertake new and different work from that referred to in the originating 
notice. 
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Design changes 
The former situation is governed entirely by section 7(5) which provides that 
“deviations” from the original design can be agreed between the parties. Therefore, 
even where the original works have been authorised by a surveyors’ award, the parties 
retain the right to agree subsequent design changes between themselves. For the 
reasons previously discussed in the context of conditional consents53 the effect of 
such an agreement is to clarify the nature of the building owner’s statutory rights 
rather than to create new rights in contract. In practice these agreements are usually 
concluded by the parties’ surveyors, on an agency basis, rather than by the parties 
themselves.54
 
  
In default of agreement the section also provides for the matter to be resolved by 
surveyors’ award through the normal dispute resolution procedures. Despite the 
ability of the parties to reach their own agreement the building owner can therefore 
rely on the ultimate safeguard of an imposed solution if his adjoining owner is 
unwilling to cooperate. Whichever course is followed, it should be noted that the 
delays associated with the service of a further notice are avoided entirely. The works 
have already been the subject of an originating notice and this remains effective 
despite changes to the original design. 
 
New works 
Where the substance of the variation involves entirely new work to that referred to in 
the originating notice it seems unlikely that the arrangements set out in section 7(5) 
will apply55
 
. As the new work has not been the subject of an originating notice it 
cannot be said to be in pursuance of the Act. The building owner will therefore have 
to obtain an entirely separate authority for the work. Unfortunately, when dealing with 
an obstructive adjoining owner the building owner will have no alternative but to 
implement a new set of statutory procedures in full, and to accept the inevitable delays 
that will result. 
However, where the adjoining owner’s co-operation is forthcoming it will be possible 
to expedite matters by agreement. This might, as we have shown56, be through an 
informal agreement or, alternatively, by an agreement to expedite the statutory 
procedures themselves. In view of the benefits of proceeding under the Act57 it is 
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considered that the latter option will usually be preferable. As the original works are 
already in pursuance of the Act it is likely that both parties will be represented by 
surveyors. Providing the surveyors have the appropriate authority they can therefore 
usually conclude all necessary formalities between themselves with minimal delay. 
Notices can be served and received by surveyors as agents and an award can be 
published in respect of the new work, often within a matter of days. With the co-
operation of the adjoining owner the statutory time limit for commencement of work 
can also be waived58
 
 and the whole process can be concluded without any adverse 
effects on the programme of works. 
Situation following informal agreement 
Where the original works have been authorised by an informal agreement rather than 
through the Act the building owner’s position will be similar to that, already 
described, in the context of new works. In the absence of an express provision dealing 
with variations59
 
 an informal agreement can provide no authority for works other than 
those actually referred to within it. The building owner will therefore have to obtain 
further authority before being able to proceed with any variations to his original 
works. 
As before, in view of the right to contract out of the Act, the parties will be free to 
reach a further informal agreement dealing with the new works. An agreement to 
expedite the statutory procedures would also be possible although, in the absence of 
earlier statutory arrangements which could be mirrored, some delays would be 
inevitable. Of course, any agreement is only possible with the cooperation of the 
adjoining owner. Without this, the building owner would have no alternative but to 
commence new procedures under the Act with all the delays that this would entail. 
 
Conclusion 
The above analysis confirms the legitimate role of agreements in each of the four 
situations considered. However, it has also demonstrated that some of the 
arrangements in common use are of questionable effect and that they are probably 
best avoided. 
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Most fundamentally, it has been shown that the parties retain a right to contract out of 
the Act entirely at any time prior to the service of an originating notice. The Act is 
concerned with the private rights of the parties rather than with questions of public 
safety. There is therefore no obligation to observe its procedural requirements where 
the parties choose to regulate these rights by what we have described as informal 
agreements, rather than through the statutory machinery. Where they do so the Act is 
permanently excluded and the parties’ rights become matters of contractual 
construction rather than statutory interpretation. We have seen how this can create 
difficulties for building owners who later wish to make variations to the works, or 
where subsequent disputes arise between the parties. 
 
We have seen that agreements are also possible following the service of an originating 
notice. However, unlike informal agreements, it has been shown that these do not 
operate as contractual arrangements but as consents, by the adjoining owner, to the 
exercise of the statutory rights described in the notice. As these agreements take effect 
within the statutory framework the problems described in the context of informal 
agreements are avoided and subsequent difficulties can be referred to appointed 
surveyors to be resolved by award. 
 
Although the Act expressly sanctions these post-notice agreements their scope has 
been shown to be quite limited. Specifically, they will only be valid to the extent that 
they record the adjoining owner’s unequivocal consent to the works referred to in the 
originating notice. They may also include a reference to drawings and a schedule of 
condition but the inclusion of provisions which attempt to supplement or vary the 
parties’ statutory obligations will be ineffective and may even jeopardise the validity 
of the agreement itself. In the case of party wall and adjacent excavation works it is 
also clear that such agreements must be entered into within fourteen days of service of 
an originating notice. After that time a dispute is deemed to arise between the parties 
which can only be settled by a surveyors’ award. 
 
Most surprisingly it has been demonstrated that agreements to the retrospective 
operation of the statutory machinery will be upheld by the courts. This provides the 
parties with the facility to regularise works which have already been commenced 
without either the service of an originating notice or the adjoining owner’s consent. 
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These agreements can extend beyond the regularisation of future works and are 
capable of conferring retrospective authority on unlawful acts which have already 
taken place. 
 
Finally, it has been shown that agreements can be a useful mechanism for expediting 
matters where the building owner wishes to vary the nature of works which have 
already been authorised. Where work is executed in pursuance of the Act the building 
owner can ultimately rely on the surveyors to authorise any reasonable design changes 
by award. However, the Act expressly preserves the parties’ rights to agree such 
matters and, in practice, they will usually proceed on this basis. Where the proposed 
variation goes beyond a mere design change and involves new work we have seen that 
the role of agreement becomes crucial to enabling the works to proceed without delay. 
 
In conclusion, the parties retain the freedom to reach agreement, both as an alternative 
to the statutory procedures, and, to some extent, as a means of adapting the procedures 
to their own particular needs. Either type of arrangement might be advantageous to 
the parties if entered into within the limitations set out in the statute, and with full 
knowledge of its legal consequences. In practice, some agreements stray beyond the 
areas that are clearly sanctioned by the Act with consequent uncertainty as to their 
validity. 
 
The decision to depart from the normal statutory procedures should not therefore be 
taken lightly. In many instances, for reasons which have been explored, the perceived 
benefits of doing so will be outweighed by the risks. Where the parties nevertheless 
wish to proceed on this basis they should confine themselves to agreements which 
have been shown to be clearly sanctioned by the legislation. In view of the 
complexities that have been highlighted in this article, all other agreements should be 
restricted to those which have been specifically approved by the parties’ legal 
advisors. 
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